Louisiana Law Review
Volume 70 | Number 1
Fall 2009

First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free
Choice Act
Catherine L. Fisk
Adam R. Pulver

Repository Citation
Catherine L. Fisk and Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free Choice Act, 70 La. L. Rev. (2009)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol70/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free
Choice Act
CatherineL. Fisk*
Adam R. Pulver"
I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant failures of the law governing unions
and collective bargaining is the catastrophic underenforcement of
the statutory right of employees to bargain. About half of all newly
certified or recognized unions are not able to persuade the employer
to agree to a collective bargaining agreement.' While both the
employer and the union could in theory be blamed for the failure to
reach an agreement, in practice the incentives are much greater for
the employer to stall negotiations (and thus defeat the union) rather
than for the union to refuse to accept an agreement (and thus
ensure its survival for the term of the contract). Refusing to bargain
for a first contract is a powerful weapon in the arsenal of
employers determined to remain union free, as it prevents a
nascent union from ever getting off the ground. While employers
can and do thwart the statutory rights of employees simply by
refusing ever to agree to a contract, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or "Board") lacks the power to remedy even the
most egregious cases of refusal to bargain 2in good faith, except to
order the recalcitrant party to bargain more.
Copyright 2009, by CATHERINE L. FISK & ADAM R. PULVER.
* Chancellor's Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine.
** Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California;
J.D., Columbia University School of Law (2008). The views in this essay do not
represent the official views of any member of the federal judiciary.
1. See John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model
of Union Organizing Drives, 1999-2004, 62 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 5

(2008) (between 1999 and 2004, of 8,155 newly certified unions, forty-four
percent failed to secure a first contract within a year of certification); Kate
Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: the Intensification of Employer Opposition
to Organizing 22, 22 fig. B (Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper No. 235,
2009), available at http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bp235/ (based on a
survey of NLRB elections from 1999-2003, fifty-two percent of newly certified
unions have not secured a contract one year after election, thirty-seven percent
have no contract after two years, thirty percent have no contract after three
years, and twenty-five percent have no contract more than three years postelection).
2. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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One provision of the proposed Employee Free Choice Act
(EFCA) 3 would deal with this problem by requiring timely
bargaining, mediation, and, if the employer and union cannot
agree, arbitration of the bargaining dispute.4 It is an important
reform in a critically dysfunctional aspect of federal labor law, and
it will be a serious improvement over the status quo. While
political and media conversations surrounding EFCA have largely
focused on the so-called "card check provision,"5 the provision for
first contract arbitration is just as important to the protection of the
right to unionize. And, as of this writing, Congress appears more
likely to enact the
6 first contract arbitration provision than the card
provision.
check
This Article argues that some form of mandatory interest
arbitration for first contract disputes is an appropriate means of
the
given
relations
employee-management
stabilizing
extraordinary difficulties that unions currently experience in
negotiating first contracts, the weakness of current NLRB and
economic remedies, and the rippling effects of these difficulties on
nascent unions. Part II of this Article explains the need for interest
arbitration given current trends in labor relations. Part III
demonstrates that interest arbitration would increase the incentive
for employers to negotiate in good faith and make reasonable
proposals without placing themselves at a systemic disadvantage.
This would be particularly true if arbitrators used the final offer
method, which requires the arbitrator to choose one of the parties'
final offers rather than to split the difference between the two
positions. Mandatory interest arbitration would encourage the
collective bargaining process that the drafters of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) initially had in mind. Furthermore,
none of the criticisms of the first contract arbitration provision of
3. H.R. 1409, 11 1th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 11 1th Cong. (2009) (introduced
Mar. 10, 2009) [hereinafter EFCA]. Except as specifically noted, all assertions
in this Article about EFCA refer to the March 2009 version of the bill. News
accounts of the Senate negotiations during the summer and fall of 2009 indicate
that the bill may be modified before it is enacted and thus the section numbers
and the specific provisions in it may change.
4. Id.§3.
5. See, e.g., Sabrina L. Schaeffer, Employee Free Choice Act Means Union
Intimidation in Plain English, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 4, 2009; Brian
Worth, Labor's Card-Check Ruse, WASH. POST May 19, 2009, at A19,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2009/06/04/employee-free-choice-actmeans-union-intimidation-in-plain-english.html.
6. See Alec MacGillis, Specter Unveils Revised EFCA Bill, WASH. POST,
Sept. 15, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitol-briefing/2009/09/specter
_unveils_prospective-de.html.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 117-43.
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EFCA have merit. Empirical studies of interest arbitration show
that it will facilitate rather than hamper bargaining, 8 and it will
remove the incentive to engage in illegal surface bargaining.
Finally, Part IV illustrates that a statutory requirement of first
contract arbitration is well within Congress' power and does not
delegation of legislative authority as
represent an unconstitutional
9
alleged by some critics.
II. WHY INTEREST ARBITRATION Is NECESSARY UNDER THE NLRA
Section 3 of EFCA proposes to give real meaning to a
provision of the NLRA that has become almost a dead letter: the
duty to bargain in good faith to a first contract.1 0 Section 3 of
EFCA would amend Section 8(d) of the NLRA to do three things,
two of which are extremely modest. The first would require the

employer to meet to bargain within ten days after receiving a
request for bargaining from the newly recognized union, but the
time for the initial bargaining could be extended by agreement of
the parties. 1 This provision would end the common practice of
stalling the commencement of bargaining for as long as possible
after certification.12 The second provision would provide for
8. See infra note 128.
9. See, infra text accompanying notes 186-211; see, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, The Case against the Employee Free Choice Act 98 (John M. Olin L. &
Econ. Working Paper, No. 452 (2d Series), 2009), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-1337185 [hereinafter Epstein, Case againstEFCA].
10. Section 8(a)(5) and Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA require the employer
and the union, respectively, to bargain, and Section 8(d) defines that duty as
being to bargain in good faith. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3), 158(d) (2006).
Section 3 of EFCA would amend Section 8(d).
11. EFCA § 3 (2009) ("Not later than 10 days after receiving a written
request for collective bargaining from an individual or labor organization that
has been newly organized or certified as a representative as defined in section
9(a), or within such further period as the parties agree upon, the parties shall
meet and commence to bargain collectively and shall make every reasonable
effort to conclude and sign a collective bargaining agreement.").
12. See, e.g., Hardesty Co. v. Teamsters Local Union 373 (Mid-Continent
Concrete), 336 N.L.R.B. 258, 260-61 (2001), enforced, 308 F.3d 859 (8th Cir.
2002) ("The Respondent's negotiating style was to put forward a harsh
bargaining proposal, stand by the proposal, then as the negotiations dragged on,
concede no more than the status quo, and stall the negotiations by refusing or
delaying its response to any additional proposals .

. .

. Additionally, as the

negotiations progressed, the Respondent, in a uniform manner, appeared to slow
down and drag out the negotiations."); Flying Food Group, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B.
101 (2004); Unbelievable, Inc.,, 318 N.L.R.B. 857, enforced in part, 118 F.3d
795 (D.C. Cir. 1997). On the strategic use of delay in negotiating with a newly
certified union, see Bruce Howard Meizlish, Surface Bargaining:A Problem in
Need of a Remedy, 1985 DET. COLL. L. REV. 721 (1985).
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mediation, conducted by the staff of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS), upon the request of either party if
the parties have not reached agreement after ninety days of
bargaining. 3 Mediation of disputes in contract negotiation by the
FMCS has a long history and is common throughout the private
sector.14 The third provision of EFCA states that after thirty days
of mediation, or such further time as the parties request:
If . . . the [FMCS] is not able to bring the parties to
agreement by conciliation, the [FMCS] shall refer the
dispute to an arbitration board established in accordance
with such regulations as may be prescribed by the [FMCS].
The arbitration panel shall render a decision settling the
dispute and such decision shall be binding upon the parties
for a period of 2 years, unless amended during such period
by written consent of the parties. 15
There is no serious dispute about the propriety of requiring
timely bargaining and mediation if three months of bargaining
produces no agreement. Most criticism of Section 3 of EFCA
focuses on the provision for interest arbitration.
Interest arbitration is nothing new: it is a time-tested process in
which the terms and conditions of employment are established by1a6
final and binding decision of an arbitrator or an arbitration panel.
Unlike grievance arbitration, a process that seeks to interpret and
apply the rules of an existing contract to determine whether a
breach has occurred, interest arbitration is designed to develop the
17
contractual rules that will govern the relationship going forward.
Although interest arbitration is not common in the American
private sector, '8 it is widely used to resolve bargaining disputes for
13. EFCA § 3 (2009) ("If after the expiration of the 90-day period
beginning on the date on which bargaining is commenced, or such additional
period as the parties may agree upon, the parties have failed to reach an
agreement, either party may notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service of the existence of a dispute and request mediation. Whenever such a
request is received, it shall be the duty of the Service promptly to put itself in
communication with the parties and to use its best efforts, by mediation and
conciliation, to bring them to agreement.").
14. The FMCS has mediated negotiating disputes since its creation by the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-197 (2006)).
15. EFCA § 3 (2009).
16. Arvid Anderson & Loren A. Krause, Interest Arbitration: The
Alternative to the Strike, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 153, 153 (1987).
17. Id.
18. David Broderdorf, Overcoming the First Contract Hurdle: Finding a
Role for Mandatory Interest Arbitration in the Private Sector, 23 LAB. LAW.

2009]

FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION & EFCA

51

public sector employees. In New York, for example, the Taylor
Law authorizes the State's Public Employment Relations Board to
begin interest arbitration proceedings when a public agency and a
union have reached an impasse in collective bargaining! More
than fifteen other states have similar provisions for at least some
public employees. 20 Some states require interest arbitration in the
case of impasse, 21 others allow the state employee relations agency
to initiate interest arbitration, 22 and some merely allow either party
to request interest arbitration. 23 Nearly all of these states either
bar 24 or limit2 5 strikes in situations where interest arbitration exists
as an option.
EFCA is not the first proposal to introduce mandatory interest
arbitration for the resolution of impasses in private sector disputes.
In 2001, Republican Senators Lott and McCain included such 26a
provision in their proposed Airline Labor Dispute Resolution Act.

323, 324, 329-31 (2008). See also infra Section III.A (discussing instances of
private sector interest arbitration).
19. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2008).
20. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.40.200(g)(1) (West 2007); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 7-473c (West 2008); CONN.

GEN. STAT. ANN. §

10-153f

(West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-11 (LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 20.22 (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D(4) (2007);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.273 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16
(West 2006 & Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §39-34-101 (2007); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 288.200-.220 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.742 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); 43
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.4 (West 1992 & Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
36-11-9 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1733 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 41.56.450 (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11 1.70(4)(cm)(5)-(6) (West 2002

& 2008).

21. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-9 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
41.56.450 (West 2006).
22. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:13A-16 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
23. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1733 (2007).
24. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2008);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-475 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10153e(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-12
(LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.12 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-C(2)(C) (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
423.202 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.19 (West 2006); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-34-105 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.230 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:13A-14(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.726
(West 2003); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 215.2 (West 1992 & Supp. 2008); R.I.
GEN LAWS § 36-11-6 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.490 (West 2006);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(L) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).
25. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (2007); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
230.40.200(g)(2) (West 2007).
26. S. 1327, 107th Cong. (2001).
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In 1994, the Dunlop Commission proposed the creation of a
tripartite "First Contract Advisory Board," which would review
disputes between unions and employers and have the authority to
order "binding arbitration for the relatively few disputes that
'27 In 1970, President Nixon proposed a form of
warrant it.
mandatory interest arbitration for "national emergency disputes" in
the transportation industry.28 At the time of the enactment of the
NLRA, some proposed that interest arbitration should be
incorporated into the statutory framework. 29 Though interest
arbitration is not common in the private sector, the FMCS reports
that it is actively involved in attempting to mediate first contract
bargaining relationships. 30 Hence, the agency is familiar with the
problem of impasse in first contracts. It simply lacks any real
power to address it. The idea that mandatory interest arbitration
may provide a solution to bargaining impasses is thus hardly
radical.
Although critics of EFCA have suggested that it is
unprecedented to use arbitration to decide major aspects of the
employment relationship, 3 1 arbitrators in fact decide a huge
number of the most financially and socially significant issues
across the whole spectrum of private sector employment. As is
well known, the business community has successfully invested
millions of dollars in litigation and legislative advocacy
surrounding compulsory arbitration in the employment and
consumer context, trumpeting the wisdom of arbitrators and the
adequacy of the arbitral forum as a dispute resolution mechanism
to decide, both in individual cases and in huge class actions, when
employees can be fired, what constitutes illegal workplace
27. U.S. DEP'TS. OF LABOR & COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23
(1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT].
28. See Gary Long & Peter Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration: "Sudden
Death" in Eugene, 27 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 186, 192 (1974).
29. Ellen Dannin & Gangaram Singh, Creating a Law Reform Laboratory:
Empirical Research and Labor Law Reform, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 16 (2005)
(citing Testimony of Francis J. Hass, in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 147-48 (1935)).

30. See William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009,
LaborLaw Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of LaborManagement Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REv. 291, 326
(2009).
31. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Ominous Employee Free Choice Act,
REG., Spring 2009, at 48, 49, 52 [hereinafter Epstein, Ominous EFCA]
(characterizing the arbitration provision of EFCA as a "dramatic departure"
from previous labor law, as being "no ordinary statute," and as ushering in a
new era in labor law).
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harassment or discrimination, whether an employer's pay and
pension practices are legal, and whether people have been injured
by fraud, malpractice, and almost every other form of harm that
can befall an employee or consumer. 32 Arbitrators decide who gets
screen credit in Hollywood.33 Arbitrators have played a major role
since the enactment of the NLRA in giving import to the vague
provisions of collective bargaining agreements-it was arbitration
that gave concrete and detailed meaning to the widespread idea
that employees should be discharged only for cause. 34 Arbitration
is used to resolve negotiating disputes in professional sports, and
arbitral decisions have made significant changes in the economics
and labor relations of the sporting industry, including creating free
agency3 5 and policing collusion among teams regarding free
agents.
While opponents of EFCA insist that arbitration is a huge
departure from the normal method of resolving workplace

negotiating disputes, it is already ubiquitous. Therefore, providing
32. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Circuit City
Store, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Arbitrators also routinely handle jurisdictional disputes
between unions, complex financial issues in stock-related disputes, and class and
collective actions in employment and consumer disputes, all at the urging of the
Chamber of Commerce. See, e.g., Institute for Legal Reform, Issue Resource
Center: Arbitration/ ADR, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/component/
ilr issues/29/item/ADR.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2009) (website of U.S. Chamber
of Commerce-affiliate, promoting arbitration in consumer and employment
contexts and highlighting legislative and media efforts).
33. WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL (2002);
WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA TELEVISION CREDITS MANUAL (2002). The
Writers Guild credits manuals are available at www.wga.org/content/default.
aspx?id=1029. They may also be obtained by writing to the Writers Guild of
America-West, 7000 West Third Street, Los Angeles, CA 90068. For an
account of some credit arbitrations, see Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's
Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49 (2006).
34. See generally John E. Dunsford, The Role and Function of the Labor
Arbitrator, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 109, 112-13 (1985) (arbitrator's options in
handling a case are practically unlimited, and once an arbitrator's reputation and
docket have grown, the parties are presumed to have agreed to adopt his past
performance as the standard to govern their dispute); Edgar A. Jones, "His Own
Brand of Industrial Justice": The Stalking Horse of JudicialReview of Labor
Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REV. 881, 885 (1983) (when a contract uses a term as
broad and vague as "just cause" it is impossible to differentiate between the
contract and the arbitrator's own views of justice).
35. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504
(2001) (describing the role of arbitration in attempting to eliminate collusion in
the free agent market); In re Arbitration of Messersmith, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 101 (1975) (arbitrator Peter Seitz determined that the reserve clause did
not bind pitcher Andy Messersmith to play for the Dodgers indefinitely). See
WALTER T. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 18:4 (2008).
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arbitration for the first contract of a newly certified union would
fix a glaring hole in the law and establish a familiar and widelyrespected process for dispute resolution.
A. The Problem of FirstContractNegotiation
First contracts create particularly complicated bargaining
situations because the parties have less information about each
other's bargaining behavior than in more established relationships.
Accordingly, they "are less able to perceive or predict accurately
the subjective costs and benefits associated with either agreement
or disagreement. 36 Unions face the added difficulties of
navigating the immature relationship between leadership and the
rank and file membership and pacifying more hostile employers
who are more likely to "bust the union" because they are not used
to having to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment.
Intervention in first contract impasse is particularly necessar '
since the parties' relationship is still "embryonic and fragile.",3
The difficulties involved in first contract negotiations have effects
beyond the first contract because they set the tone for the ongoing
union-management relationship. Employers generally know "that
if they can avoid the execution of bargaining agreements during
the certification year, they can often defeat the newly certified
union." 38 As former NLRB Chair William Gould notes, a union
that is "unable to conclude a collective bargaining agreement, will
have declining support within the bargaining unit, because in the
United States, the collective bargaining agreement and protections
39
contained in it are the sine qua non for effective representation.
Moreover, "even those [unions] that achieve a first contract may
not alter the anti-union strategies utilized by management to deny
workers positive outcomes of collective bargaining. 'A That is,
management has very strong incentives to violate the duty to
bargain in good faith because it can defeat the union entirely. Even
if the union survives, management's intransigence can intimidate
the employees and their union into making concessions on
important contract terms that become part of the status quo and are
36. William N. Cooke, The Failure to Negotiate First Contracts:
Determinants & Policy Implications, 38 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 163, 165
(1985).
37. Gould, supranote 30, at 325 (2008).
38. Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The
Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to Reform LaborLaw, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1616,
1641 (1995).
39. Gould, supra note 30, at 327.
40. Broderdorf, supra note 18, at 332.
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harder to change in later rounds of negotiation. Thus, the rewards
for failure to bargain in good faith are the greatest at the initial
contract stage.
To take a well-known recent example, the employees of MidContinent Concrete voted to unionize in early 1995 .41 The
company commenced contract negotiations by proposing to cut
wages, health insurance, and paid overtime, as well as eliminate
the employees' 401(k) plan.42 As the bargaining dragged on for a
year, the company's later offers were even less favorable to the
employees than its initial offer.4 3 Finally, towards the end of a year
of fruitless negotiations, certain company officials candidly
admitted that they intended to drag out the bargaining for an entire
year and then seek to decertify the union once the employees
realized that the union had been unable to produce any results in
negotiation. 44 Based on this evidence, the NLRB found that the
employer had violated its duty to bargain in good faith.45 The only
remedy it could order, however, was more bargaining.46 It issued
its order in 2001, and the court of appeals finally enforced the
Board's order in 2002. 47 So, seven years after the employees voted
to unionize, and after years of litigation, it was finally determined
that the employer had illegally refused to bargain, and it was
ordered to do so. As explained below, the duty to bargain is largely
insignificant because the NLRB and the courts have decided that
they cannot award meaningful remedies for violations of this duty.
The problem is most acute in the case of first contracts. Mandatory
interest arbitration is the only device that will protect the
employees' statutory right to collective representation in the
workplace.
B. The Weakness of NLRB Remedies
One of the most acute regulatory failures of federal labor
relations is in the area of bad faith bargaining. The current
structure of the NLRA and the weak remedies it provides play a
large role in unions' problems in finalizing first contracts.
Mandatory interest arbitration has the potential to counter some of
these issues.
41.
(2001),
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Hardesty Co. v. Teamsters Local Union 373, 336 N.L.R.B. 258, 264
enforced, 308 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 265-66.
Id.
Id. at 261-62.
Id. at 260-61.
Id.
NLRB v. Hardesty Co., 308 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2002).
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Although Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA imposes a duty to
bargain in good faith, the United States Supreme Court long ago
decided that the Board lacks the authority to force a recalcitranteven an illegally recalcitrant-party to reach agreement. 48 Nor will
the Board impose monetary remedies to compensate for an
employer's illegal refusal to bargain, even when it is quite clear
what monetary harm occurred. 4 9 All it will do is order the party
that bargained in bad faith to bargain more and to do so in good
faith. 50 "Because the order can do little more than compel the
employer to make cosmetic changes in its negotiating stance in
order to bring itself into bare compliance with the law, chances are
slim that the union will be able to win a first contract with the
backing of such an order alone."51 An employer determined to
resist the lawful right of its employees to unionize and bargain
collectively can thwart their rights simply by refusing to enter into
a collective bargaining agreement. Eventually, after the employer
drags out the negotiations for years and makes plain its refusal to
enter into an agreement with the union, the employees or the union
give up. The employer can then withdraw recognition and remain
union-free.
Even where impasse is reached in good faith, the default
setting favors employers. Employers are empowered, after
bargaining to impasse, to unilaterally implement the terms made in
their final offer to the union. 52 Thus, unless the union can make a
credible strike threat, the employer has no incentive to reach
agreement with the union because it knows that ultimately it can
get what it wants just by bargaining to impasse. If the law were
otherwise, and employers were prohibited from unilaterally
implementing their preferred terms at impasse, or if the law
required the employer to implement the union's preferred terms at
impasse, the employer would not have the incentive to delay and
would have a stronger motivation to bargain.

48. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); see also NLRB. v. Am.
Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952) ("[T]he Board may not, either directly or
indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive
terms of collective bargaining agreements.").
49. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970).
50. See, e.g., HUNSICKER, KANE & WALTHER, NLRB REMEDIES FOR
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (2d ed. 1986).
51. Paul C. Weiler, Striking New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the
Prospectsfor Union Representation,98 HARv. L. REv. 351, 361 (1984).
52. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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The idea that weaknesses in the NLRA are larely responsible
for the failure to achieve first contracts is not new. 3 Conservative
courts and boards have consistently interpreted the NLRA
narrowly in a manner that has increased the evidentiary burden for
establishing a failure to negotiate in good faith and decreased the
ability of unions to enforce the statute's substantive provisions. In
H. K Porter Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held that, under the
NLRA, the NLRB has no authority "to compel agreement when
the parties themselves are unable to agree," even where an
employer is engaged in a variety of bad faith negotiation tactics
over an eight-year period. 54 In fact, where an employer has failed
to engage in good faith bargaining, both the NLRB and various
courts have suggested that the only remedy the NLRB can provide
is to order good faith bargaining.
During the Nixon
Administration, the NLRB determined, in a narrowly-divided case,
that it lacked the power to remedy an employer's refusal to bargain
by compelling
the employer to do anything other than bargain
56
more.
53. See, e.g., Cooke, supra note 36 at 164 ("[M]uch of labor's difficulty in
securing first contracts is attributable to weaknesses in the National Labor
Relations Act.").
54. 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970). See also Broderdorf, supra note 18, at 332.
55. See, e.g., Hyatt Mgmt. v. NLRB, 817 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970). But see TNT USA, Inc. v.
NLRB, 208 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (allowing NLRB to give effect to a
specific agreement "that the parties would have signed ... absent bad faith").
See also Broderdorf, supra note 18, at 332 ("Unilateral changes, surface
bargaining, and stalling tactics are only remedied with an order to bargain."
(citing Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections
and First-Contract Campaigns, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN
LABOR LAW 75, 75 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994))).

56. In Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), the Board split three-two
on the question of whether the NLRB could issue compensatory remedies for
failures to bargain in good faith. See also Tiidee Prods., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234
(1972), enforced, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (declining to award monetary
damages to make employees whole even in case of employer's "clear and
fragrant" violation of law, but awarding union and NLRB litigation expenses);
Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (NLRB lacks
authority to award attorneys' fees even in case of "egregious and deliberate
surface bargaining" designed to frustrate agreement and provoke a strike
because the company manager wanted a strike so he could replace the
employees and get rid of the union), enforcing in part, Unbelievable, Inc., 318
N.L.R.B. 857 (1995). As scholars have pointed out, ample data based on the
employer's contracts at other unionized plants enabled relatively precise
calculation of the economic harms caused to employees by the employer's
illegal conduct, and state labor boards do issue compensatory remedies in failure
to bargain cases. See, e.g., George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agric. Labor
Relations Bd., 783 P.2d 749 (Cal. 1989).
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The lack of effective remedies means that an employer has
every incentive to stall bargaining for several years, which will in
turn erode support for the union. 57 Even obtaining an order to
bargain in good faith can take years. 58 This delay effectively
reduces "the cost to the employer of disagreeing with the union's
demand that a contract be signed" while increasing the cost to
union leadership as more organizing expenses are incurred. 59
Employers have seized upon the flaws in the remedial structure
of the NLRA to thwart employees' right to unionize. The evidence
shows that the failure of the NLRB and the courts to develop
remedies for bad faith bargaining has dramatically undermined the
policy of the NLRA to support the mutual determination of wages
and working conditions through collective bargaining. During the
last decade, nearly half of all newly certified unions failed to reach
a collective bargaining agreement.60 This means that half of all
workers who exercise their right to select union representation
never get to take advantage of this right by engaging in its intended
purpose: collective representation in the determination of wages
and working conditions. The problem has only gotten worse in the
last decade: as recently as the early 1990s, only approximately
of newly unionized employees failed
one-third, instead of one-half,
61
to secure a first contract.
There is a consensus among scholars, members of the NLRB,
and judges sympathetic to labor that the weaknesses of the
remedies for illegal failures to bargain frustrate the unionprotective purposes of the law.62 Former Attorney General and
Harvard Law professor Archibald Cox described the problem in
1958: "As long as there are unions weak enough to be talked to
57. Cooke, supra note 36, at 164.
58. Craver, supra note 38, at 1635 ("It may take a year or more for the
Labor Board to issue remedial bargaining orders in these cases, and losing
employers can avoid bargaining for an additional year while the Labor Board
petitions for court of appeals enforcement orders.").
59. Cooke, supra note 36, at 167.
60. John-Paul Ferguson, supra note 1, at 16.
61. DUNLOP COMMissION REPORT, supra note 27.
62. The literature on Board remedies is voluminous. Samples of some of the
leading works relevant to bargaining remedies are cited elsewhere in this
Article. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 51; Craver, supra note 38; Cooke, supra
note 36, and sources cited infra note 63. On the difficulties in asserting whether
particular Board doctrines are consistent with statutory purposes, because the
NLRA as amended over the decades embodies multiple and arguably
inconsistent purposes on the question of how vigorously to protect the right to
join (or not join) a labor union, see Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud,
The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with its Structure and
Function andSuggestionsfor Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013,2033-36 (2009).
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death, there will be employers who are tempted to engage in the
forms of bargaining without the substance. The concept of 'good
faith' was brought into the law of collective bargaining as a
solution to this problem." 63 A law that protects the freedom to
select a bargaining representative is undermined by the failure to
prevent illegal anti-union conduct after that representative is
certified; employers determined to prevent unionization can
bargain endlessly without ever reaching agreement. But neither the
NLRB nor the courts have been willing to impose injunctive or
monetary remedies to stop the unlawful behavior or to compensate
employees for the harm they suffer as a consequence of an
employer's refusal to bargain. While this crabbed interpretation of
the scope of the NLRB's regulatory authority is not compelled by
64 decades of scholarly criticism have
the statutory language,
65
proved fruitless.
C.Arbitration Is Desirable When Work Stoppages Are Not
Unless the government is prepared to impose all terms of
employment and resolve all workplace disputes directly through
legislation or litigation, there are two options for resolving them:
the parties can use economic force (strikes, lockouts, going out of
business, or quitting a job), or a neutral third-party can resolve the
dispute. In the public sector, as noted above, because economic
weapons are prohibited in many jurisdictions, arbitration is used to
resolve both negotiating disputes and individual disputes once the
parties have a contract. In the private sector, the general rule is that
economic weapons resolve negotiating disputes and arbitration
63. Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REV.
1401, 1412-13 (1958). See, e.g., DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27;
Charles J. Morris, The Role of the NLRB and the Courts in the Collective
Bargaining Process: A Fresh Look at the Conventional Wisdom and
UnconventionalRemedies, 30 VAND. L. REV. 661 (1977); Theodore St. Antoine,
A Touchstone for Labor BoardRemedies, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1039 (1968).
64. Section 8(d) of the NLRA, added as part of the Taft-Hartley Act,
defines the duty to bargain in general terms with the proviso that "such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). Scholars, courts, and
NLRB members have debated for decades whether this language compels the
conclusion that no remedy can be imposed that would have the effect of
preventing a strong employer from, as one scholar put it, "talking a union to
death." See Cox, supranote 49, at 1412-13.
65. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 63. R. W. Fleming, The Obligationto Bargain
in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988 (1961); Weiler, supra note 51; Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, A BargainingAnalysis ofAmerican Labor Law and the Searchfor
BargainingEquity and IndustrialPeace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1992).
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resolves disputes arising under contracts. But, in fact, as explained
below, the use of economic weapons is prohibited in a wide array
of circumstances. In many of those, arbitration or some form of
third-party dispute resolution is preferred. EFCA reflects a policy
judgment that the resort to economic weapons by either party is
disfavored in first contract scenarios, particularly given the
difficulty of strikes by newly certified unions-arbitration is a
preferable way of resolving negotiating disputes. This policy
judgment is both entirely justified in the current legal and
economic climate and consistent with the overall philosophy of
labor law.
1. The Unavailabilityof Strikes
Both prior to and since the enactment of the NLRA, workers
have retained a form of self-help remedy: the strike. However,
changes in business and the law have greatly diminished the utility
of strikes as a means to achieve concessions. In light of
technological advances and the global economy, employers no
longer fear strikes of American workers like they did in the early
twentieth century. Particularly in times of high unemployment and
economic turmoil like the present, employer fear is at its lowest,
and American workers, reluctant to lose a paycheck for even a
brief period of time, recognize that there are great risks related to
striking, both for the union as an organization and for the
individual employees in the bargaining unit.
In arguing that the current situation regarding first contracts is
not problematic, Richard Epstein illustrates how employers seem
to view strikes as just another economic risk in bargaining, rather
than the super-threat they once were. 66 If first contract negotiations
lead to a strike or a lock-out, he contends, that is merely the result
of an employer's calculus as to "how much it thinks it will lose in
operating flexibility, wages and competitive position under a
collective bargaining contract." 67 In other words, a strike over a
first contract is merely the result of an employer's (rational)
decision that a strike is less costly than signing any collective
bargaining agreement. This would appear to be bad faith
bargaining since an employer cannot decide that it will refuse to
sign any contract with a union simply because it does not believe
in collective bargaining or respect the employees' choice of

66. Epstein, Case againstEFCA, supra note 9, at 51.
67. Id.
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representative. 68 Unfortunately, at least one court of appeals has
implicitly endorsed Epstein's argument that a complete refusal to
bargain can somehow be "good-faith" bargaining if the employer
has a "good reason." In Chevron v. NLRB, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the NLRB could not punish an employer for
is
bad faith bargaining simply because "the employer's position 69
inherently unreasonable, or unfair, or impracticable, or unsound.
The court concluded that "[d]eep conviction, firmly held and from
which no withdrawal will be made, may be ... both the right of the
citizen and essential to our economic legal system . . . of free
collective bargaining., 70 In other words, the Chevron court found
the duty to bargain in good faith does not require bargaining at all.
Employers know, though, that the threat of strike is particularly
weak, and thus the risk associated with inflexible bargaining is low
in first contract negotiations, where, statistically, workers are
particularly unlikely to strike. Since workers are more skeptical as
to the benefits of collective bargaining and representation, they
will be less likely to conclude that the risks associated with a strike
outweigh the potential benefits. 7 1 The union's likely low levels of
solidarity further diminish workers' bargaining power, as each
member has little reason to trust his fellow workers.72 This
combination contributes to a vicious cycle. Workers fail to strike,
hoping the employer will come around and negotiate in good faith.
At the same time, the employer looks to the willingness of workers
to actually strike if an agreement is not reached as a key factor in
determining whether or not to bargain in good faith.73
2. ArbitrationIs Widely Used When Strikes Are Undesirable
There are many circumstances already recognized in American
law in which one party or the other has the labor market power to
use self-help, but for policy reasons legislatures have restricted the
use of that power and forced the parties to use third-party dispute
68. See also Broderdorf, supra note 8, at 332 ("For the one-third of newly
organized employees that do not achieve a first contract, bad faith or dilatory
bargaining may be to blame for a portion.").
69. Chevron Oil Co. v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 (5th Cir. 1971). In
the underlying dispute, "[d]uring the course of the negotiations the Company
granted non-Union employees certain wage increases and improved benefits that
it denied Union-represented employees." The company also rejected all of the
"Union's proffered concessions and proposals." See also Epstein, Case against
EFCA, supra note 9, at 16 (arguing that a failure to bargain is often rational).
70. Chevron, 442 F.2d at 1072.
71. Cooke, supra note 36, at 165.
72. Id. at 165.
73. Id. at 168.
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resolution instead. The enactment of mandatory first contract
arbitration recognizes that in the case of a newly certified union,
the weaker party is likely to prefer arbitration to economic
weapons.
First, third-party dispute resolution is the favored policy when
work stoppages are deemed "to imperil the national health or
safety.",74 Under the so-called "National Emergency" provisions of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), enacted when the
post-war strike wave persuaded the Republican-controlled
Congress that strikes were not a desirable form of dispute
resolution, the President is empowered to enjoin strikes and to seek
third-party resolution of any dispute "affecting an entire industry
or a substantial part thereof' engaged in interstate commerce."
This provision was recently utilized when a bargaining dispute
shut down the West Coast ports in 2002. As a lockout dragged on
while the union refused to accede to the employer's bargaining
demands, the line of ships waiting to dock stretched for miles into
the Pacific Ocean. 76 Companies then complained bitterly about the
harm that resolving bargaining disputes through economic force
inflicted upon the U.S. economy, and President Bush sought and
obtained an injunction against the labor dispute, triggering thirdparty involvement in negotiating a settlement. 77 The argument then
favored by the Chamber of Commerce was that the use of
economic force to resolve negotiating disputes endangered the
health of the economy by disrupting the flow of commerce and
endangered national security by tying up the principal arteries of
commerce. 78 In enjoining both the lockout and any future strike in
that dispute, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California found that:
[C]ontinuation of the closure of West Coast ports will
endanger the national economy and labor force ....
Continuation of the closure would harm the national
economy still recovering from recession . . . . In our
complex economy, where large industries must compete in
a global marketplace and small businesses must
74. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (2006).
75. Id.
76. United States v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010 n.l (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
77. See generally id.
78. See Carolyn Lochhead, Bush Feels Push to End Lockout, S. F. CHRON.,
Oct. 4, 2002, at A1; Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber
Urges Negotiated West Coast Port Settlement (Nov. 18 2002), http://www.
uschamber.com/press/releases/2002/november/02-197.htm.
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continuously sustain sales to survive, a prolonged
bottleneck in the vital transportation chain will critically
of domestic producers, retailers
disrupt the interdependence
79
and consumers.

Courts have regularly enjoined strike activity in a variety of
situations where arbitration existed as an alternative option. In the
context of a collective bargaining agreement containing a no-strike
clause, the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union Local 770 extolled "the effectiveness of the arbitration
technique as a method peacefully to resolve industrial disputes
without resort to strikes, lockouts, and similar devices" and
required that federal courts enjoin strikes in violation of no-strike
clauses over arbitrable issues and order the parties to arbitrate.80 In
a later case, involving the famously militant United Mine Workers
(UMW), who could, and did, effectively use the power of the strike
to secure better working conditions both during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement and during contract negotiations,
the mining companies insisted that strikes should be prohibited
because the arbitration clause of their contract provided a better
method of resolving disputes. 8 ' The Supreme Court agreed, stating
that strikes could be enjoined even if the contract did not contain a
no-strike clause on the theory that an arbitration clause should be
deemed to prohibit strikes unless the parties clearly agreed that the
use of economic weapons was preserved. 2 Several years after the
strike that led to that decision, Tom Geoghegan, a former lawyer
for the UMW, described why the mining companies preferred
arbitration:
The Court reasoned that we don't need strikes anymore and
everything could be decided by a neutral arbitrator .... So
if miners were worried about a safety problem, they
couldn't go on strike, at least during the contract. They had
to arbitrate like civilized people.
The problem is, it's not so civilized down there. The Boys
Market case changed the balance of power between the
UMW and the companies. Previously, the companies could
only bring damage suits (which for quickie "twenty-fourhour strikes" were pointless), but now they could get TROs
[temporary restraining orders], with immediate fines. Now
79.
80.
(1970).
81.
82.

Id. at 1010-12.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
Id.
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they could sit on grievances for years. They could change
the safety rules, or fire militants, and know that the union
strike, or do anything except wait and wait and
couldn't
83
wait.
As Geoghegan points out, mandatory arbitration changes the
balance of power, both during the term of a contract and during
negotiations for a new contract, and it tends to weaken the position
of the party that could most effectively use economic force while
correspondingly strengthening the party that cannot.84 During the
West Coast ports stoppage of 2002 and the mine workers disputes
of the 1960s and 1970s, the use of arbitration strengthened the
power of management. Today, arbitration would strengthen
nascent unions in the first contract scenario. This is not in and of
itself problematic, though, as labor law is full of instances in which
Congress, the NLRB, or the courts have decided that economic
weapons should be prohibited because they give too much power
to one side and enable that side to cause collateral damage to
consumers and the economy by interrupting the normal operation
of product and labor markets. It is for this reason that Congress
prohibited secondary boycotts, 85 that courts have prohibited sitdown strikes 86 and barred employees engaged in workplace protest
from making disloyal or especially offensive comments about their
employer, 87 and that the NLRB has prohibited slow-downs 88 and
strikes at times that pose a risk of significant harm to the
employees who honor a picket line at
employer 89 and protected
90
another workplace.
83. THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You ON? TRYING TO BE FOR
LABOR WHEN IT'S FLAT ON ITS BACK 3 1(1991).

84. Id.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 303 (repealed 1974).
86. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
87. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 477 (1953) (employees
negotiating for a new collective bargaining agreement cannot disparage the
quality of the employer's services unless the criticism is clearly tied to criticism
of working conditions); New River Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290, 1294
(4th Cir. 1991) (same); Endicott Interconnect Tech. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (same).
88. In re Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
89. Int'l Protective Servs., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 701 (2003) (employees of
government contractor hired to guard federal building in Alaska cannot strike
during the months of March and April because the Oklahoma City federal
building was bombed during April several years before and a strike during April
might be risky if a future act of terrorism were timed to occur on the anniversary
of a prior attack).
90. See Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 343 (2000); Bus. Servs. By
Manpower, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 827 (1984) (refusal to cross picket line is
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The addition of interest arbitration during first contract
arbitration will simply be one of many instances in the private
sector in which labor law determines that the use of economic
weapons to resolve negotiating disputes is unduly harmful to
business, to workers, and to the economy. It will substitute
arbitration for economic weapons when bargaining disputes
threaten to undermine the most basic right protected by the NLRA:
the right to choose to be represented by a union in negotiating the
terms and conditions of employment.
III. INTEREST ARBITRATION WILL WORK
There are three ways that disputes over working conditions can
be resolved, and all are used in our economy in various
circumstances. One is by the government dictating conditions. The
federal Fair Labor Standards Act, enacted in 1938 as part of an
economic stimulus to address unemployment and low wages
during the Depression, sets minimum terms of employment. 9 A
second method of settling terms is by allowing whichever party has
greater economic or political force to extract whatever bargain it
can get. This is the approach used both under the current law
governing union relationships and when there is no union. In the
non-union sector, most terms of employment are not negotiated.
Some terms are negotiated individually (often salary), some are set
unilaterally by the employer for the entire workforce without
opportunity for negotiation (usually benefits), and some are set
unilaterally by the employer but are subject to individual
modification (such as criteria for promotion). Some terms are
relatively easy to negotiate for (salary), and others are details that
parties typically avoid explicitly discussing (grounds for discipline
and discharge) such that they tend to be set unilaterally by the
employer. Some terms are rarely discussed (work rules). In
unionized workplaces, of course, all these terms are negotiated,
although many terms are standard (just cause for discipline and
discharge, grievance arbitration, and management rights clauses
are common across agreements and are phrased similarly). The
third way in which disputes over working conditions are resolved
is by allowing some third party to assist the negotiators in agreeing
to terms. This is the approach that has long been used to resolve
negotiating disputes in the public sector and in several private
protected), enforcement denied, 784 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1986) (refusal to cross
picket line unprotected).
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
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sector organizations, perhaps most notably in Major League
Baseball salary negotiations. Critics of EFCA's interest arbitration
provision nonetheless argue that compulsory interest arbitration
will not only fail to eliminate the problems associated with first
contract impasses but also will cause a variety of negative
outcomes in the greater bargaining relationship. These fears are
unsupported by either economic theory or data from prior uses of
interest arbitration. Third-party neutral involvement in the
resolution of bargaining disputes has a long and illustrious history
in American labor relations, and for good reason.
Interest arbitration typically occurs, as it would under EFCA,
when the parties have failed to reach an agreement after bargaining
unsuccessfully for an extended period of time. By that point they
have both put forward proposals on every term that is
conventionally covered in a collective bargaining agreement.
Often, the parties have agreed to a variety of terms, with only some
disputed terms remaining. The parties usually have gathered
information regarding wages, benefits and working conditions in
comparable work settings, cost of living data, and data regarding
the employer's financial situation. Interest arbitrators then examine
this information and produce a decision that sets the terms of the
contract. In most public sector interest arbitration, arbitrators, by
practice or by statute, consider a well-settled list of factors: the
stipulations of the parties; the "interests and welfare of the public
and the financial ability of the unit of government to meet these
costs;" comparable wages, benefits, hours, and conditions of
employment of government employees performing similar work in
similar communities and in the private sector; the cost of living;
the employees' current compensation; recent changes in
circumstances regarding any of the foregoing; and any other
factors that "are normally or traditionally taken into consideration
in the determination of wages, hours and conditions 92of
employment... in the public service or in private employment."
92. The language quoted in the text, and the list of factors, are identical in
the Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin statutory provisions governing interest
arbitration for police and firefighters. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/14(h) (West
2005 & Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.239 (West 2001); WiS.
STAT. ANN. § 111.77(6) (West 2002). In some states, such as Pennsylvania,
there have at times been no statutorily prescribed factors. But in the judgment of
arbitrators familiar with the system, this makes no difference because arbitrators
tend to consider all the same factors anyway. See A. Scott Buchheit, Arbitration
Forums Revisited: Interest Arbitration, 42 PRoC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 171, 172,
175-76 (1990), available at http://www.naarb.org/proceedings/pdfs/1990171.pdf. See also Gregory G. Dell'omo, Wage Disputes in Interest Arbitration:
Arbitrators Weigh the Criteria, 44 ARB. J., June 1989, at 4 (two-thirds of
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A. InterestArbitration Will ProvideIncentives to Bargain;It Will
Not Remove the Incentives to Bargain
1. Theoretical Underpinnings

One can evaluate the success of interest arbitration in one of
two ways: by examining the effect of the availability of
compulsory arbitration on bargaining outcomes or by examining
the outcomes of the use of compulsory arbitration. 93 Since there is
no reason to think an FMCS arbitrator will be biased towards
employers or unions, commentators have largely focused on the
effects the availability of arbitration will have on pre-arbitration
bargaining.
"The object of interest arbitration is to provide an incentive for
the parties to negotiate their own agreement, rather than risk an
unfavorable outcome at arbitration." 94 Richard Epstein has
nevertheless argued that when faced with an "obstructionist" party,
the other side will simply "run out the clock" and let the matter go
to arbitration 130 days into negotiations. 95 A variation on the same
criticism is that arbitration creates an incentive for each side to
make unrealistic demands in the hopes that the arbitrator will split
the difference. 96 This is simply a way of rephrasing an old criticism
of interest arbitration, which is that it produces a "chilling effect"
on bargaining. 9 7 Other commentators have claimed that interest

arbitrators surveyed in Wisconsin said it makes no difference in their awards
whether or not there are statutory criteria).
93. John Thomas Delaney, Strikes, Arbitration, and Teacher Salaries: A
BehavioralAnalysis, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 431,432 (1983).
94. Paul L. Burgess & Daniel R. Marburger, Do Negotiated andArbitrated
Salaries Differ Under Final-Offer Arbitration?,46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
548, 548 (1993).
95. Epstein, Case againstEFCA, supra note 9, at 51.
96. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill III, Binding versus Final-Offer
Arbitration:A Combination is Best, 32 MGMT. SC. 1346, 1347 (1986). See also
Vincent P. Crawford, On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes, 87 J. POL. ECON.
131, 132 (1979).
97. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and
Experience, 26 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 313, 331 (1993). Anne Layne-Farrar makes a
similar argument, claiming that obstruction itself will be encouraged, noting:
If a union expects a more favorable arrangement through arbitration
than it is currently being offered by the employer, union organizers
would have a strong incentive to refuse all terms proffered by the firm,
no matter whether they are reasonable or not. And likewise for the
employer: if company representatives anticipate favorable treatment
from the arbitrator, they will reject all offers from the union, regardless
of their merit.
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arbitration has a "narcotic effect" on bargaining because it "creates
dependency in the parties participating in it and weans them away
from real collective bargaining."' 8 The "narcotic effect" argument
has no applicability to EFCA since the statute provides only for
first contract arbitration.99 After that, the parties must bargain to
their own agreement.
Research does not support the argument that interest arbitration
necessarily produces a chilling effect on bargaining. 100 Both
empirical data of actual results and logic suggest that, in the
circumstances of first contracts, interest arbitration will actually
encourage parties to bargain because the outcome of arbitration is
an unknown, as discussed in detail below. Neither party knows
with certainty what the results of interest arbitration would be, and
even a non-obstructionist party cannot guarantee that the contract
terms it would reach through negotiation would be less beneficial
than those selected by an arbitrator. While parties will no longer
focus on the difference between the costs of a potential strike or
lockout and those of negotiating in good faith, they will still be
forced to calculate the risk of getting a less beneficial outcome in
interest arbitration than the offer on the table in negotiation. This is
hardly a radical change in how negotiation strategies are devised,
as it merely replaces one unknown but easily ascertained variable
(likelihood of and cost of strike) with one that provides the
employer with more uncertainty (likelihood of and cost of an
arbitrator award less favorable than that which would result from
good faith bargaining). Anne Layne-Farrar suggests that the fact
that the availability of interest arbitration will "change the
calculus" involved in negotiations is itself a flaw of EFCA, " but
changing the calculus is the point of the interest arbitration
provision, and, indeed, all of the provisions of EFCA.
The uncertainty of interest arbitration would encourage parties
to bargain closer together and avoid impasses. In fact, by

Anne Layne-Farrar, An EmpiricalAssessment of the Employee Free Choice Act:
The Economic Implications 8 (Law & Econ. Consulting Group, 2009), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1 353305.
98. Dannin & Singh, supra note 29, at 44 (citing HARRY KATZ & THOMAS
KOCHAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 346 (1992)). See also Malin, Public Employees' Right to Strike,
supra note 97, at 331-32; John M. Magenau, The Impact of Alternative Impasse
Procedureson Bargaining: A LaboratoryExperiment, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 361, 361-62 (1983).
99. See EFCA § 3.
100. See Part II.A.2.
101. Layne-Farrar, supranote 97, at 8.
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eliminating employers' incentives to reach impasse and providing
an additional reason to reach agreement, "[i]mpasses of any
duration could become relatively rare. ' 02 Researchers have found
that the mere presentation of a dispute to an arbitrator encourages
parties to make their offers "around" the expected arbitration
award, moderating their positions, since arbitrators will "judge
extreme offers to be unreasonable and put less weight on such
factors."' 10 3 As one scholar put it, "Interest arbitration may be seen
as the engine that drives settlement [or] as the grease that allows
the wheels of collective bargaining to turn. [Interest arbitration is
really bear grease: it's so bad, you don't want to touch it, so you do
anything to avoid it." 104 When faced with the prospect of interest
arbitration, employers are more likely to make concessions, often
"up to the point at which their final offer equals the expected
arbitration award plus at least some portion of the direct cost of
using the procedure.' ' 10 5 Some employers who oppose interest
arbitration at a greater rate than unions may also make concessions
simply to avoid arbitrating certain issues.' 0 6 While interest
arbitration may thus place more pressure to negotiate on employers
than on unions, this is largely a function of the fact that,
particularly in the first contract scenario, there is currently a strong
incentive for the employer not to bargain and to reach impasse and
a corresponding strong incentive for unions to bargain to
agreement and to avoid impasse. Since there is no guarantee an
arbitrator will provide a more beneficial outcome, mandatory
interest arbitration would likely have little or no effect on unions'
incentives to bargain.
2. Case Studies
This theoretical analysis is supported by an examination of the
use of interest arbitration over the past thirty years. In fact,
examining the use of public sector interest arbitration in New York
City, Arvid Anderson and Loren Krause found that interest
102. Ellen Dannin, From Dictator Game to Ultimatum Game... and Back
Again: the JudicialImpasse Amendments, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 241, 293
(2004).
103. Max H. Bazerman & Henry S. Farber, Arbitrator Decision Making:
When are Final Offers Important?, 39 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 76, 78 (1985)
(citing Henry S. Farber, Splitting-the-Difference in Interest Arbitration, 35
INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 70 (1981)).
104. Robert M. Ackerman, Arbitration Forums Revisited. Interest
Arbitration, 42 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 186 (1990).
105. Delaney, supra note 93, at 433.
106. Id. at 433.
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arbitration actually served as "an alternative to the strike that
similarly stimulates bargaining" because it "enables the labor
participants to retain the leverage necessary to bargain effectively
in negotiating a contract. At the same time, the harmful effects of a
strike are avoided."' 10 7 Analyzing data from 1972-1986, they found
that, contrary to critical predictions that the option of final binding
arbitration would decrease the incentive to negotiate and thus lead
to a massive increase in impasses, only eight percent of municipal
contract negotiations resulted in interest arbitration.10 8 They also
noted that the accompanying ban on strikes was violated only three
times in that time period, though ten strikes had occurred in the
four years preceding the
implementation of the City's interest
09
arbitration procedures.'
One of the rare instances in which American private sector
employers and employees agreed to utilize binding interest
arbitration was a brief period in the 1970s and 1980s when the
steel industry and its unions entered into an "Experimental
Negotiating Agreement" (ENA) after a series of harmful widescale strikes.'The ENA included a provision for binding interest
arbitration in the case of impasse. The provision was never
activated, however, because "the parties reached agreements in
1974 and 1977 without using interest arbitration; each side feared
the contractual outcome if the situation was turned over to an
interest arbitrator.""' The provision was not included in future
agreements.112
Other agreements between private employers and employees to
implement binding interest arbitration at impasse have had
similarly positive results. In the 1980s, Philip Morris USA and its
unions agreed to a system where negotiation issues not resolved
within thirty days of contractual expiration would be submitted to a
tripartite arbitration panel. l1 3 Over the course of the provision's
life, less than ten percent of negotiations resulted in interest
arbitration. 114 More importantly, though, the interest arbitration
provision led to decreased "reliance on economic pressure and
107. Anderson & Krause, supra note 16, at 156, 179.
108. Id. at 176.
109. Id. at 177.
110. Broderdorf, supra note 18, at 330 (citing ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 50304 (Laura J. Cooper et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2005)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 330 (citing Dennis H. Liberson, Labor Relations: Long-Term
Agreements Work at Philip Morris, PERSONNEL J., Dec. 1989, at 36).
114. Id.(citing Dennis H. Liberson, Labor Relations: Long-Term Agreements
Work at Philip Morris,PERSONNEL J., Dec. 1989, at 38).
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'traditional table pounding and threats,"' and "increased
information sharing, more 115
dialogue, and mutual problem-solving
approaches to negotiation."
3. Final-OfferArbitration:A PotentialProcedurefor
Implementation
For those who are genuinely concerned that mandatory
arbitration will lead to either extreme or lazy bargaining positions,
one potential option would be the use of "final-offer arbitration"
(FOA) by FMCS, pursuant to its authority to implement EFCA. As
of this writing, news reports on the ongoing negotiations over
EFCA have indicated that the latest version of the Senate bill
proposes to direct the FMCS to use FOA (which the Senators call
"last best offer arbitration").' 16
In FOA, first proposed by Carl Stevens in 1966," 7 the
arbitrator must choose between the final offers of the parties and
cannot come up with his own compromise contract. FOA was
developed specifically in response to the criticism of conventional
arbitration that arbitrators tended to split the difference between
the last offers of the parties, 18 and that such behavior chills
bargaining and promotes
excessive reliance on the arbitrator to
119
reach an agreement.
As with conventional interest arbitration, the purpose of FOA
is to "use the arbitrator's power to impose settlements to induce
agents to reach their own agreements, without requiring that the
arbitrator actually impose a settlement."' 20 But "[b]ecause the
arbitrator must choose one of the two submitted offers under FOA,
each party is likely to submit a more concessionary offer
2 in order
to increase the probability that its offer will be chosen."' '
115. Id.
116. See MacGillis, supra note 6.
117. Carl M. Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with
Bargaining?,5 INDUS. REL. 38 (1965).
118. Id.See also Crawford, supra note 96, at 132.
119. Bazerman & Farber, supra note 103, at 76-77. See also Burgess &
Marburger, supra note 94, at 549; Dannin & Singh, supra note 29, at 44 n.57
(citing In re Interest Arbitration between the State of Or. Dep't of Admin. Svcs. on
behalf of Dep't of Corr. Sec.y Employees & Am. Fed. of State, County & Mun.
Employees, IA-07-01, http://corrections.oregonafscme.com/arbitrationgrievances/
2001arbitration.htm ("Last best offer by total package combats the so-called
'narcotic' effect of conventional arbitration by denying an arbitrator any flexibility
to create a compromise between the parties' positions.")).
120. Crawford, supra note 96, at 132.
121. Burgess & Marburger, supra note 94, at 549. See also Ellen J. Dannin,
Collective Bargaining,Impasse and Implementation of Final Offers: Have We
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It has been noted that the earliest recorded use of FOA was at
the trial of Socrates in ancient Athens, where the jury "was not
permitted to compromise between the punishment suggested by the
prosecution (death) and the punishment recommended by the
defense (a fine)."' 12 Most famously in modem times, FOA has
been used to resolve salary disputes. This method has been in place
in Major League Baseball since 1974.123 As with other forms of
interest arbitration, players negotiate their salaries with team
124
management first before they may choose to resort to FOA.
Furthermore, like conventional interest arbitration, the availability
of FOA has itself increased players' bargaining power in prearbitration negotiation, regardless of whether the issue ever
reached an arbitrator. 125 The use of FOA in MLB salary
negotiations has been found to create an incentive for players to
make more moderate offers, as those "players who proceed to
arbitration fare worse financially than those who settle."' 126 Most
recently, FOA was included in the airline dispute resolution
legislation introduced in the Senate in 2001.127
The availability of salary FOA has been successful in reducing
impasse in other settings as well. Analyzing mandatory FOA of
wages of New Jersey firefighters and police officers over an
eighteen-year period, Orley Ashenfelter and Gordon Dahl found
that employer victory rates have converged towards fifty percent
over time, suggesting there is no innate benefit to either employers
or unions in FOA. r28 On an average over the period, unions

Created a Right Unaccompanied by Fulfillment, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 41, 71
(1987) ("Certainly if one is required to explain the rational basis for a proposal,
one is more likely to advance proposals which have some rationality.").
122. Orley Ashenfelter et al., An Experimental Comparisonof Dispute Rates
in Alternative ArbitrationSystems, 60 ECONOMETRICA 1407, 1408 (1992).
123. Burgess & Marburger, supra note 94, at 550-51. For a more detailed
description of FOA in Major League Baseball, see Spencer B. Gordon, Final
Offer Arbitration in the New Era of Major League Baseball, 6 J. AM. ARB. 153,
160-65 (2007); Amy Farmer et. al., The Causes of Bargaining Failure:
Evidence From MajorLeague Baseball,47 J. L. & ECON. 543, 550-51 (2004).
124. Burgess & Marburger, supra note 94, at 551.
125. Id. (citing Paul L. Burgess & Daniel R. Marburger, BargainingPower
& Major League Baseball, in DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER: THE BUSINESS OF
BASEBALL 50 (Paul Sommers ed., 1992) (finding eligibility to engage in MLB

FOA itself results in fifty-eight to eighty-nine percent salary increase)).
126. Farmer et. al., supra note 123, at 545, 563.
127. See Airline Labor Dispute Resolution Act of 2001, S. 1327, 107th Cong.
(2001).
128. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, Strategic Bargaining Behavior,
Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of
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prevailed in approximately sixty percent of scenarios. 29 At the
same time, "the difference between the parties' offers has tended to
decrease over time," indicating FOA may have the effect of parties
taking more moderate positions. 13° An experimental study by
DeNisi and Dworkin found similar results, as the availability of
FOA induced both simulated management and union
representatives to make far more reasonable initial offers than in
traditional bargaining. 13 That study also found that FOA has the
potential to improve relationships between workers and
management, particularly when the parties involved in the
negotiation have a good understanding of the process.' 32 Numerous
studies have shown that the availability of FOA as opposed to
conventional 33 arbitration produces higher rates of negotiated
settlements.
Anecdotal evidence from experienced arbitrators suggests that
FOA in the public sector tends to produce a significant number of
voluntary settlements by the parties before the arbitrator has the
chance to issue an award, as well as what arbitrators consider
reasonable positions. One arbitrator reports, based on his
experience with FOA in New Jersey:
Because it is final offer arbitration, parties listen seriously
to what the arbitrator has to say. As a result, if a party
comes to the arbitration hearing with an unreasonable
position, it will almost always alter that position prior to the
close of the hearing out of fear that if it does not, the other
party's offer will be selected and it will be the "loser" in the

Final-OfferArbitration 2 (Princeton Law & Public Affairs, Working Paper No.
04-009, 2003), availableat http://ssm.con/abstract=559188.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Ashenfelter and Dahl attribute some of these changes to the increased use
of third-party agents, predominantly by employers, as they have "moderated selfserving expectations, and thus increased employer wage offers and their win
rates." Id. at 4. Over the time period studied, the percentage of parties that hired
third-party agents rose from thirty to approximately seventy-five percent. Id. at 7.
131. Angelo S. DeNisi & James B. Dworkin, Final-OfferArbitrationand the
Naive Negotiator,35 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78, 83-84 (1981).
132. Id. at 86-87.
133. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, Divergent Expectations as a
Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence From a Comparison of
ArbitrationSchemes, 104 Q. J. ECON. 99, 100-01 (1989) (collecting studies). See
also A.V. Subbarao, The Impact of Binding Interest Arbitration on Negotiation
and Process Outcome: An Experimental Study, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 79, 98
(1978) (finding FOA to lead to concessions by both unions and employers).
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proceeding. As a result, a high percentage of settlement is
achieved through the arbitration process. r'
While most FOA has focused on disputes over single issues,
usually salary, there have been other applications that address a
wider range of disagreements in contract negotiation. Arbitration
of an entire contract, where the arbitrator chooses between the total
35
proposal of each party, is referred to as "total package" FOA.1
"Issue by issue" FOA, on the other hand, allows arbitrators to
construct a reasonable settlement by selecting different aspects
from each of the parties' final offers on individual issues. ' 3 The
arbitrator "may, for example, combine the union's wage proposal
with management's proposal for fringe benefits
1 37 if this combination
seems more equitable to him than any other."'
Professors Dannin and Singh studied total package FOA as part
of a simulation of collective bargaining that examined the
responses of representative "employers" and "unions" to three
potential legal regimes: (1) the current NLRA regime, which
allows an employer to implement its own final offer at impasse; (2)
total package FOA; and (3) mandatory agreement, with the option
to strike or lockout employees as a bargaining tool, but with no
option to permanently replace workers. '3They found that both the
employers and union representatives viewed FOA as "promot[ing]
a more even balance of power."' 139 Union representatives also
reported the mere availabilit of FOA was influential in shaping
their negotiation strategies. 40 But perhaps the most important
finding was that both union and employer representatives reported
a large degree of satisfaction with the FOA regime, whereas each
14 1
of the other two systems was satisfactory to only one side.
prefer issue-byEmployers' main criticism was that they would
42
issue FOA as opposed to total package FOA. 1
The principal criticism of total package FOA is that it creates
an incentive for the parties to prepare an otherwise reasonable
package while including one unreasonable provision in the hope
that this unreasonable item will be included in the final proposal
because the arbitrator will conclude that, despite the unreasonable
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Buchheit, supra note 92, at 173-74.
See, e.g., Broderdorf, supra note 18, at 340.
Crawford, supranote 96, at 150-51.
Id. at 151.
Dannin & Singh, supra note 29, at 13-14.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 34.
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provision, the overall reasonable package makes the most sense.
The simple expedient to address this is to allow the arbitrator to
remove one item from the final package. Any party who attempts
to evade this restriction by including two unreasonable proposals
would face the risk that the arbitrator will spot the strategy and
therefore deem the
14 3package as a whole less desirable than the other
party's proposal.
Given that the availability of FOA has an even greater
tendency than conventional interest arbitration to promote good
faith negotiation and concessions from both parties, it would be a
particularly sound procedure for the FCMS to adopt in effectuating
the interest arbitration provision of EFCA.
B. Interest Arbitration Can Producea Sensible Contract
Opponents of EFCA's interest arbitration provision contend
that labor contracts are too complex for arbitrators to handle,' 44 but
there is no empirical basis for the assertion. Interest arbitration has
been used for decades in the public sector and has produced
perfectly adequate contracts across a variety of trades and
professions.
The thrust of the Epstein-Chamber of Commerce position is
that the arbitrator may choose a resolution that is not in a
company's interest. This is entirely speculative, of course. There is
no factual basis for believing that arbitrators chosen to resolve
bargaining disputes will not understand the company's business. In
the first place, interest arbitration, like collective bargaining,
always occurs based on research and projections both parties have
done about the employer's financial situation, labor and product
markets, the working conditions at comparable companies, and so
forth. This evidence is produced to the arbitrator by both parties.
Because federal labor law already requires private sector
employers to provide some information to substantiate their claims
in bargaining, it will not be a significant change to require that the
information be provided to an arbitrator. 14 5 Nor is there any reason
to believe that arbitrators will choose a resolution that harms the
company's business. Experienced arbitrators generally believe that
interest arbitration rarely results in a departure from the status quo
in terms of economic and noneconomic working conditions. As
143. See Walter J. Gershenfeld, Interest Arbitration: State and Local
Government Experience, 35 PRoC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 190, 201 (1983).
144. See Epstein, Case against EFCA, supra note 9, at 64; Letter from
Seyfarth Shaw, LLP to Senator Edward Kennedy, et al. (Feb. 13, 2009).
145. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
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Professor Malin, himself an experienced interest arbitrator, put it,
"[a]rbitrators are inherently conservative as adjudicators" and "are
strongly inclined against changing the status quo.' ' 146 The reason
for this, Professor Malin explains, is that the arbitrator's function
"is to devise a contract that the parties
likely would have reached
47
had the process not broken down."'
The Epstein-Chamber of Commerce position is primarily that
interest arbitration will be bad for business because it will increase
labor costs and reduce management discretion. 48 The argument
about labor costs is easily addressed. If arbitration contributes to
the higher average salaries in the public sector, as compared to
comparable private sector work, it can be attributed to the so-called
"ratchet" effect of repeated cycles of interest arbitration in which
an arbitrator is reluctant ever to impose a concession on labor, as
noted in the various studies cited above. Under EFCA, there will
be no repeats of interest arbitration (unless, of course, the employer
and the union both agree to it) since the statute only applies to first
contracts. So, if an arbitrator awards wages and benefits that the
employer deems too high (or the union deems too low), the parties
are free to negotiate for a change after the expiration of the twoyear contract. If the arbitrator imposes a term that both the
company and the union find undesirable, they can change it
immediately. EFCA allows the parties, by mutual consent, to
renegotiate the contract even within its two-year term.
The thrust of this critique, like so many of the criticisms of the
interest arbitration provision, is that first contract interest
arbitration will not be as beneficial for employers as the current
approach of delay and bad faith negotiation until employers are
able to unilaterally implement their final offer. This is not a
critique of interest arbitration itself, but rather of the goal of
equalizing power in labor-management relations.
Moreover, insofar as the argument is that an "outside"
arbitrator is involuntarily imposing a contract on workers and
employers, and thus depriving them of "choice," EFCA would still
be fairer in this regard than the current system. Under the current
system, the default when the parties fail to reach an agreement is
the unilateral imposition of the employer's preferred terms. Here,
at the least a third-party will select the terms if the parties cannot
themselves agree.
146. Malin, supra note 97, at 333 (1993).
147. Id. at 333.
148. Epstein, Ominous EFCA, supra note 31, at 54 (arguing that EFCA
would "force the employer to hire some arbitrary workers" at a wage it does not
wish to pay and might lead an employer into bankruptcy).
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C. InterestArbitration Is Better than the Alternatives
1. ArbitrationIs Expeditious and Affordable
One argument against arbitration advanced by the Chamber of
Commerce is that it is "a time-consuming, expensive process."'1 49 It
is odd to see companies objecting so strongly to arbitration as a
"time-consuming, expensive process" ill-suited to employment
relationships, inasmuch as they have insisted for years that
arbitration is a speedy, affordable, and flexible way to resolve
disputes involving employment relationships. 50 But the Chamber
of Commerce argument seems to be that first contract arbitration
will take longer than negotiating a first contract. This is an
assertion with no basis in fact. Consider a simple example drawn
from a California Court of Appeal decision upholding first contract
Act.' 51
arbitration under California's Agricultural Labor Relations
In that case, a union was certified as the representative of Hess
Winery agricultural employees. 152 After an unspecified time, Hess
Winery and the union commenced negotiating for a first
contract. 153 They bargained for four years, from 1999 to 2003,
without reaching agreement.15 4 At that point Hess Winery declared
an impasse and unilaterally implemented its preferred terms. 155 In
April 2003, the union sought the involvement of the state agency,
the Agricultural Labor Relations Board. 156 The Board ordered the
parties to mediate, which they did, but by August 2003, the
mediator had been unable to get the parties to resolve all the
outstanding issues. 157 Arbitration promptly ensued and concluded
by late September 2003 at which time a collective bargaining
agreement was adopted.f58 Then the company spent three more
years challenging the collective bargaining agreement in court; the
California Supreme Court finally rejected the challenge in
September 2006.159 The unsuccessful bargaining took three years,
and the fruitless litigation took another three years. The mediation
149. Letter from Seyfarth Shaw, supra note 44.
150. Id.See, e.g., Circuit City Store, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
151. Hess Collection Winery v. Cal. Agric. Labor Relations Board, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 609, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
152. Id. at 616.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id.
159. Id.at 628.
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a collective bargaining agreement in less
and arbitration produced
60
than six months.'
At the same time, Richard Epstein argues that the arbitration
provision forces employers to act too quickly.16 1 He contends the
availability of interest arbitration 130 days after union recognition
presents an unfair surprise to employers when combined with the
card check provision of EFCA since unions "know[] in advance the
targets of [their] card check drives and can have [their] negotiation
162
team in place before the results of the card check are computed.'
Epstein is particularly concerned with the effects such "surprise"
will have on small businesses that "may not be even able to find a
and could "be
lawyer to represent them during this short period"
63
time."'1
same
the
at
claims
multiple
by
besieged
There is no data that supports this theory of unfair surprise.
Epstein does not explain what exactly will be so difficult about
putting a "negotiation team in place" that would prevent good faith
bargaining from occurring in a period of over four months. He also
presumes that unions will always want to initiate interest
arbitration at the 130-day mark. This ignores reality and is tied to a
general view of unions as manipulators. If a union and employer
are engaged in good faith negotiation, there is no reason to
presume the union will terminate that negotiation in favor of
interest arbitration and its uncertain outcome. Moreover, there is no
reason why it would take an employer acting in good faith over
four months to seriously engage with its workers and their certified
representatives. Employers have been competent to craft anti-union
organizing campaigns in much shorter time periods.
Even when a union chooses to initiate interest arbitration,
though, there is still a ninety-day period during which the parties
must continue to negotiate.'6 Epstein makes the unsupported
blanket statement that ninety days represents a "short time for
addressing the multiplicity of issues in play. ,165 But in the
commercial context, few would claim that ninety days is an
unreasonable time to negotiate a complex contract; even fewer
would argue that the 220 combined days is an unreasonable time to
negotiate such a contract. Furthermore, Epstein assumes that
workers and employers will be at impasse over every single issue
in a contract. By the 220th day after certification, it is likely that at
160. Id
161. Epstein, Case againstEFCA, supra note 9, at 11.
162. Id
163. id
164. EFCA § 3.
165. Epstein, Case Against EFCA, supra note 9 at 11.
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will be resolved if the parties
least some aspects of the contract 166
have been negotiating in good faith.
As for costs, it is hard to see how the shortened timetable of
interest arbitration could be more costly than months of unfruitful
bargaining followed by proceedings before the NLRB and often a
federal court of appeals. In perhaps one of his most absurd
arguments, Epstein asserts that interest arbitration would impose
an unfair cost on employers who would be forced to spend mone
lobbying the FMCS because it creates implementing regulations.
First, any such burden will be shared by unions, who have just as
great an interest in the outcome as any other party. Second, the cost
of regulatory lobbying by businesses has never caused businesses
to fail before, and it is disingenuous to suggest that this provision
will be the nail in the coffin.
2. ArbitrationShould Not Be Limited to Cases in Which Bad
FaithBargainingHas Been Proven
Some have asserted that EFCA should be revised to provide for
interest arbitration only as a remedy in cases where the NLRB has
determined that an employer or a union has bargained in bad
faith.' 68 The essence of the argument is that arbitration is
essentially a punishment and should be imposed only when one
party to negotiations has violated the law and deserves to be
penalized. But the premise of the argument is false-arbitration is
not a punishment. More importantly, limiting arbitration to cases
of proven bad faith will not eliminate the employer's incentive to
engage in bad faith bargaining because the delay associated with
the legal proceedings necessary to prove bad faith will enable the
determined employer to undermine employee support for the union
before the union has a chance to prove itself by negotiating a
contract.
As noted above, one of the problems with current law is the
incentive to delay and drive up costs as a way of defeating a newly
recognized union. In the Mid-Continent Concrete case (Hardesty)
discussed above, the employer dragged out the bargaining for a
year in order to avoid the statutory requirement that a newly
certified union cannot be challenged through a representation
election for a year from initial certification. It took the NLRB until
166. Of course, if the argument against this provision is merely that the time
periods should be extended, that is something that could easily be modified in
the proposed legislation without altering section 3's general function.
167. Epstein, Case againstEFCA, supranote 9, at 12.
168. See, e.g., Broderdorf, supra note 18, at 348.
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six years after bargaining began to issue its decision finding the
employer had bargained in bad faith, and it took the court of
appeals more than a year to enforce that decision. It hardly protects
the employees' right to bargain collectively to make them wait
seven years to litigate through multiple levels of the NLRB and
then litigate again in
69 the federal court of appeals in order to finally
obtain arbitration.'
Some have suggested that the problem of delay could be
addressed if the NLRB were to aggressively invoke its power
under Section 10(j) of the NLRA to seek federal court injunctions
against bad faith bargaining. But a Section 10(j) injunction would
only produce a court order to the employer to bargain; under
current law the employer cannot be forced to enter into a
contract. 170 And so the employees would still have to wait the
years it would take to have a final NLRB determination of bad
faith bargaining.
Moreover, the standards articulated by the NLRB to prove a
failure to bargain in bad faith are exceedingly high. In Hardesty it
was only the ill-advised remarks by certain management
employees, that they had no intention ever of agreeing to a contract
with the union and that they planned to wait until the one-year
certification bar had passed before seeking to decertify the union,
that clinched the case for a finding of bad faith. 171 In the face of a
legal regime that protects the right of an employer to refuse ever to
agree to a contract term, proving a failure to bargain in good faith
is extremely difficult. Would it be bad faith for an employer to
decide to allow its employees to strike, or to lock them out, and
then to hire permanent replacements in the hope of undermining
support for the union?
In the end, most of the policy arguments against first contract
arbitration reveal themselves to be simply arguments against
unions and collective bargaining more generally. In critiquing the
first contract interest arbitration provision of EFCA, Richard
Epstein unintentionally bolsters the case for interest arbitration by
demonstrating his fundamental gripe: he does not like collective
bargaining. He says labor unions misleadingly describe the
purpose of interest arbitration as "facilitating initial collective
bargaining agreements" and that, in reality, unions are merely
"frustrated by their inability to obtain first contracts that advance

169.
(2001),
170.
171.

Hardesty Co. v. Teamsters Local Union 373, 336 N.L.R.B. 258, 260-61
enforced, 308 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2002).
See Gould, supra note 30, at 325 (noting inadequacy of 10(j) orders).
Hardesty, 336 N.L.R.B. at 260-61.
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their interests under the traditional bargaining system."', 72 First, it
is unclear how these descriptions are inconsistent. But even if one
adopts the second description only, there should be nothing
objectionable about union frustration regarding a widespread
inability to negotiate beneficial terms in first contracts. The idea
that there is something wrong when unions seek to achieve
mutually beneficial agreements via good faith negotiation speaks
to a general hostility to the idea of collective bargaining as a
whole, not to an ulterior motive on behalf of unions.
Interest arbitration is not a perfect system. FOA, particularly
when it follows bargaining and mediation as it would under EFCA,
promotes settlement, but when settlement fails arbitrators find
themselves making difficult choices.' 73 Arbitration that allows the
arbitrator to impose terms not offered by either party may not
promote as much voluntary settlement as FOA. Interest arbitrators
tend to lament that parties cannot bargain to their own contract.
But the alternative to interest arbitration in at least half of all cases
involving newly certified unions is not that the parties agree to
their own contract. The alternative to interest arbitration is that
nearly half of newly unionized bargaining units will have no
contract. So the relevant question is not whether arbitration is
better than bargaining at producing a collective bargaining
agreement-the question is whether arbitration is better than no
agreement after years of bargaining. The answer is clearly yes.

172. Epstein, Case againstEFCA, supra note 9, at 16.
173. For example, as was stated by Professor Malin in his Opinion and
Award in Illinois FraternalOrder of Police Labor Council & Village of Fox
Lake, ISLRB No. S-MA-98-122, at 9 (1999) (Marlin, Arb.):
The theory behind such final offer interest arbitration is that the
"winner take all" nature of the proceeding will motivate the parties to
moderate their positions and will push them toward agreement. Even if
they do not reach agreement, their positions will be sufficiently
moderated that what will remain is for the arbitrator to select the more
reasonable of the competing offers. Most of the time the process works.
However, sometimes the final offers presented are far from ideal and
the arbitrator is faced with weighing factors to determine which of the
competing offers is less problematic.
And as stated by Arbitrator Lankford, in his Opinion and Award in Oregon State
Police Officers Association and Oregon Department of State Police (2000)
(Lankford, Arb.), reprinted in JOSEPH R. GRODIN, JUNE M. WEISBERGER &
MARTIN H. MALIN, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 346,
358 (2004) ("In package-based interest arbitration there is an inevitable hazard
that the prevailing package will include one or two quite disreputable minor
proposals. This is such a case.").

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

IV. FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL

Another argument advanced by some critics of EFCA is that
the use of FMCS mediators is an unconstitutional delegation of
congressional authority. As a matter of legal doctrine, the first
contract arbitration provision of EFCA is indisputably
constitutional. Whatever the continuing vitality of the
nondelegation doctrine, a matter as to which there is significant
scholarly dispute,' 74 it has not been held to apply to delegations of
power to establish procedures for resolving individual disputes, as
we explain below.' 5 EFCA does not delegate legislative power to
create rules applicable across the board to every workplace; it
simply empowers the FMCS to resolve individual disputes
involving particular workplaces. Even if the nondelegation
doctrine were to apply to individual instances of dispute resolution,
EFCA and the statutes that it amends provide sufficient standards
to guide the FMCS in the exercise of its power.
The nondelegation doctrine was first announced by the
Supreme Court in the early 1930s when the Court held that Article
I of the Constitution implicitly barred Congress from delegating its
legislative power to administrative agencies. 7 6 In the face of the
growth of administrative agencies-beginning in 1887 with the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and continuing
with the creation of the Federal Trade Commission by the antitrust
laws of the 1890s and the creation of the NLRB in 1935-those
concerned with the development of the modem administrative state
argued that the Constitution restricted the ability of Congress to
delegate legislative power to the executive branch or independent
agencies. In two 1935 decisions, the Supreme Court held two
legislative delegations in the National Industrial Recovery Act
unconstitutional. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the
Court struck down a provision that instructed the poultry industry
to create a code governing the sale of chickens in New York City
and working conditions for those raising and selling live chickens,
174. See infra note 180.
175. See, e.g., April Rolen-Ogden, Note, When Administrative Law Judges
Rule the World: Wooley v. State Farm, 66 LA. L. REV. 885, 893-94 (2006)
(noting demise of non-delegation doctrine allows agencies to exercise
adjudicative power); Jack M. Beermann, CongressionalAdministration, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 61, 145 n.388 (2006) (noting adjudicatory delegations resulting
in case-by-case decision-making would survive even a more restrictive
nondelegation doctrine).
176. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 327-28 (3d ed. 2006); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 362-65 (2d ed. 1988).
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with the only congressional1 guidance being that the code should
"promote fair competition." " In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
the Court struck down a provision that authorized the President to
prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of oil produced in
statute did
excess of state-imposed production quotas, holdinp-the
r78
not provide the President with sufficient standards.
The nondelegation doctrine was controversial from the start, as
many believed that good governance in the complex modern state
necessitated the delegation of power to expert agencies that were
able to manage the huge quantity of complex regulations that
Congress could not possibly control itself.'17 The Supreme Court
abandoned its nondelegation doctrine war on the administrative
state almost as soon as it began and has not declared any federal
law to be an impermissible delegation of legislative power since
1935. 80 While, in recent cases, the Court has stated that when
Congress delegates legislative power it must provide "intelligible
principles" to guide the agency's exercise of discretion, 18 ' it has
found every delegation of rulemaking power, no matter how broad,
to be permissible. 182 Agencies across the range of the government
operate under exceedingly broad and vague delegations of
authority. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is
177. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
178. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
179. See, e.g., Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
180. As a consequence, there is a lively debate among scholars as to whether
the nondelegation doctrine is or should be thought of as grounds for judicial
invalidation of congressional and agency action. See, e.g., Gary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REv. 202 (2002) (defending
nondelegation doctrine); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
NondelegationDoctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1722 (2002) (arguing that the
nondelegation doctrine never existed--"[n]ondelegation is nothing more than a
controversial theory that floated around the margins of nineteenth-century
constitutionalism," that was applied in two aberrant cases in 1935, and is
unjustifiable on grounds of original meaning or structure of constitution and on
grounds of sensible policy); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of
the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1297 (2003) (defending nondelegation doctrine); Richard B. Stewart,
Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 323 (1987) (arguing that the
nondelegation doctrine is not judicially administrable).
181. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
182. For instance, the Supreme Court upheld a broad delegation of power to
the Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines for the federal
courts. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). The Supreme Court
rejected a nondelegation challenge to the provision of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, under which the circumstances in which the death penalty
would be imposed were prescribed by executive order. Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748 (1996).
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delegated power to regulate broadcasting "in the public
interest."18 3 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is empowered
to address "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices."' 1 4 The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) is empowered to issue standards
"reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
The Secretary of State
employment and places of employment."
rules as the President
such
"under
is authorized to issue passports8 6
prescribe."'
and
designate
shall
Although the nondelegation doctrine has supporters in
academia and in some lower federal courts,'8 7 the Supreme Court
in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. unanimously
reversed the only recent case in which a court of appeals had
revived the doctrine."' In Whitman, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals declared unconstitutional the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) air quality regulations as to ozone levels on the
grounds that the Clean Air Act, which delegated the power to
adopt the regulations, had no "intelligible principle" to determine
why one level of pollution is permissible rather than another when
all amounts entail some risk to public health. 89 The Supreme
Court reversed, with Justice Scalia, himself no fan of expansions of
federal power, writing for the Court, on the ground that the statute
did provide "intelligible principles" to guide the agency's
discretion. 190
To the extent that the nondelegation doctrine remains a serious
constitutional restriction on the ability of Congress to delegate
183. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006); see Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943) (upholding Communications Act delegation to FCC of power to
regulate "in the public interest" against a nondelegation challenge).
184. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41,45(a) (2006).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2006). The Supreme Court rejected a nondelegation
doctrine challenge to OSHA in Industrial Union Department v. American.
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The argument that broad delegations
of power to set working conditions is unconstitutional seems to have gained
respectability lately with Cass Sunstein's article arguing that OSHA represents
an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration to set standards for workplace safety. Cass Sunstein, Is OSHA
Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REv. 1407 (2008). The Sunstein argument
essentially revives the position articulated by then-Justice Rehnquist in his
concurrence in IndustrialUnion Department.
186. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 21 (1965) upheld that regime against a
nondelegation challenge.
187. See supranote 175.
188. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
189. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. U.S. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd
sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
190. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 476.
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power to agencies, there are two questions to consider in assessing
Section 3 of EFCA. The first is whether the nondelegation doctrine
even applies to the arbitration process for resolving individual
bargaining disputes in individual workplaces. As explained below,
it does not. The second question, which is reached only if the
nondelegation doctrine applies, is whether a court could find
intelligible principles to guide the FMCS in conducting arbitrations
from general statements in the NLRA, as amended, about the duty
to bargain, the harms to commerce of unnecessary work stoppages,
and the desirability of FMCS intervention to facilitate bargaining
and to prevent labor disputes from interfering with the flow of
commerce. Such intelligible principles exist.
A. The Nondelegation DoctrineDoes Not Apply to Delegationto
an Agency of the Power to Resolve IndividualDisputes
Unlike the vast majority of instances in which litigants or
commentators have raised the nondelegation doctrine, EFCA does
not delegate power to the FMCS to impose rules applicable across
a segment of the economy. Rather, the power that Congress
proposes to delegate in Section 3 of EFCA is the power to establish
a procedure for resolving individual negotiating disputes. This is
not the kind of delegation subject to a nondelegation challenge, as
it is widely accepted that Congress need not specify the processes
an agency must follow in resolving individual disputes. For
example, in Sibbach v. Wilson, the Supreme Court summarily
rejected a nondelegation challenge to the Rules Enabling Act, in
which Congress delegated to the Supreme Court, which in turn
delegated to a Rules Advisory Committee, the power to
promulgate rules of practice, procedure, and evidence for the
federal courts. 191 The guidance Congress provided in the Rules
Enabling Act is that federal rules may not "abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right." 192 As is well known to every law

student who has wrestled with the Erie doctrine, 193 this vague
guidance hardly provides a clear, "intelligible principle."
There are a number of reasons why EFCA's proposed system
of resolving individual negotiation disputes is not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. First, what the
agency is considering is an individual dispute, and the resolution of
the dispute will be a private contract. The FMCS is not empowered
to establish rules generally applicable to every workplace or rules
191. 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
193. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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enforceable through criminal or other processes of law. The
nondelegation doctrine has never been held to apply to the
resolution of individual disputes (what is usually considered
adjudication); rather, it has only been argued to apply to
rulemaking. The classic nondelegation challenge is to a statute
through which Congress has decided to apply a new substantive
rule or standard to govern the behavior of a sector of society but
leaves to the agency the task of actually determining what that rule
or standard will be. The argument behind the nondelegation
challenge to OSHA was that it empowered the agency to set
standards not explicitly approved by Congress that would be
binding on every workplace covered by the statute. 194 The
argument behind the nondelegation challenge to the Clean Air Act
was that it authorized the EPA to create its own standards that
would be binding on every covered polluting entity. 195 In contrast,
with individual negotiation disputes, the only standards that are set
are wages and working conditions for a single bargaining unit for a
period of two years-and only if the union and the employer fail to
agree to their own terms. This is adjudicatory in nature because it
is a narrow decision based on the specific factors of a specific case
and only applying to that specific case. A nondelegation challenge
could perhaps exist if Congress delegated to the FMCS the more
general authority to set terms and conditions for an entire sector of
the workforce, but that is not what EFCA does.
Much of the NLRA, including Section 3 of EFCA, does not
regulate terms of employment. It simply controls the method by
which the parties resolve disputes in their efforts to set their own
terms by regulating the processes of unionization and bargaining
and by empowering arbitrators to fill in the gaps. Congress has left
to private entities the decision whether to pay or work for wages
above the federally-mandated minimum, whether good cause will
be required for firing, whether layoffs will be based on seniority or
other factors, and the like. When the employer has market power, it
can dictate those terms with little concern for the desires of the
employees. When the employees unionize or find other forms of
labor market power, they can insist on better terms than they might
otherwise receive. Under current federal labor law, the employer
can impose the terms even on an unwilling union and employees
once the negotiations have reached impasse. 9 6 All that the NLRA
does is make the agreement that the parties ultimately reach
enforceable in federal court, and it empowers private arbitrators to
194. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
195. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 457.
196. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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decide what those agreements mean. 197 Similarly, under the
Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has authorized private
arbitrators to resolve individual disputes in the non-union sector,
and it has
made those arbitrators' decisions enforceable in federal
98
court. 1

In addition, the mandatory arbitration provision also differs
from statutes traditionally challenged under the nondelegation
doctrine in that resort to arbitration is entirely optional. Unlike
OSHA, the Clean Air Act, or the other regulatory regimes that
have drawn nondelegation challenges, any employer or union that
does not wish to have a contract or any term of a contract imposed
by arbitration need only bargain to an agreement themselves.
Parties can opt out of the system simply by agreeing to terms,
which is the entire point of the NLRA as it exists.
The third and most important reason why the first contract
arbitration provision is constitutional is this: the alternative to
having the arbitrator impose terms is having the employer
unilaterally impose terms. Under the current legal regime, if the
employer and the union cannot reach an agreement, the employer
is entitled to unilaterally implement the terms it made in its final
offer. 199 EFCA changes this regime in one limited circumstance by
providing that in the case of a newly certified union, the employer
cannot impose its final offer, but instead, if it and the union cannot
agree, the terms will be set by an arbitrator for a period not to
exceed two years. After that two year period, the employer and
union will go back to the bargaining table, and, if they cannot
agree, the employer will have the right to unilaterally impose its
terms after bargaining to impasse. If it is not an unconstitutional
delegation to give employers the power to unilaterally set wages, it
is hard to see how allowing an arbitrator to set wages would be.

197. 29 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
198. See Circuit City Store, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); 2 U.S.C. § 2
(2006).
199. As is well known, the Supreme Court decided in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), that Section 301 of the LMRA, which
vests jurisdiction in the federal courts of suits for violations of collective
bargaining agreements, was in fact a delegation of power to make substantive
rules governing labor-management relations. The Court then proceeded to invent
a series of rules in the famous Steelworkers Trilogy that further delegated to
arbitrators the largely unreviewable power to decide the scope, meaning, and
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. United Steelworkers v. Am.
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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B. IntelligiblePrinciples
It may be contended that the constitutional infirmity is not to
the use of arbitration to set the terms of contracts, but rather that
the statute, at least as it was introduced in Congress in March 2009,
does not give the FMCS sufficient direction in telling arbitrators
how to conduct the arbitration. The March 2009 bill did not, for
example, specify whether the arbitrator must choose final offer
arbitration or conventional arbitration, or upon what basis the
arbitrators should make their decisions. News reports suggest that
later drafts of the bill may direct the FMCS to use final offer
arbitration. 200 Some have pointed out that states that use interest
arbitration typically have legislative guidelines telling the
arbitrator what factors to consider, and that EFCA as introduced in
March 2009 does not.2 0 1 But all sorts of federal statutes delegate
decision-making power to agencies without detailed specifications
of how the agency should exercise its power. Moreover, the law
governing agency interpretation of statutes, namely the doctrine 202
of
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
seems premised on the very idea that delegation in the form of
broad statutory language is both necessary and permissible.2 °3
Where statutes are nonspecific, courts are to defer to any
reasonable interpretation by an agency authorized to interpret the
statute.
Even so, EFCA, as an amendment to the NLRA, does provide
"intelligible standards" to govern the exercise of FMCS discretion.
The interest arbitration provision of EFCA is an amendment to
Section 8 of the NLRA that imposes a duty to bargain as part of the
general purpose of the NLRA. With respect to the general purposes
underlying the duty to bargain, Congress found:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees
who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce,
200. MacGillis, supra note 6.
201. See, e.g., Broderdorf, supranote 18, at 345.
202. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (courts should defer to agency interpretations of their enabling statutes).
203. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
Power in the Administrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 452, 478 (1989) (noting
that the theory behind nondelegation doctrine is "fundamentally at odds with
Chevron's assumption that Congress may empower agencies to decide what
regulatory statutes mean whenever they appear ambiguous").
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and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of
competitive wage rates
2 4 and working conditions within and
between industries. 0
With respect to assistance in resolving bargaining disputes, the
LMRA of 1947, which was an amendment to the NLRA, created
the FMCS and empowered it "to prevent or minimize interruptions
20 5
of the free flow of commerce growing out of labor disputes."
The purposes of the LMRA were broadly stated, following a
finding that:
[I]ndustrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of
commerce... can be avoided or substantially minimized if
employers, employees, and labor organizations each
recognize under law one another's legitimate rights in their
relations with each other, and above all recognize under
law that neither party has any right in its relations with any
other to engage in acts or practices
which jeopardize the
20 6
public health, safety, or interest.
To that end, the LMRA imposed on "employers and employees
and their representatives" the duty to "exert every reasonable effort
to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours,
and working conditions" and to "participate fully and promptly in
such meetings as may be undertaken by the Service under
20 7 this Act
for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute."
The FMCS and its processes, as well as the general practices of
interest arbitration in the sectors where it is used, are well known
to labor and management, so Congress is not writing on a blank
slate. The factors and processes that interest arbitrators use are also
well known. No one has argued that EFCA prescribes some
procedure other than interest arbitration. By providing the private
sector with the exact same type of negotiating dispute resolution
that has been used in the public sector for decades, Congress is
simply applying a familiar process to another sector of the
economy.
The California Court of Appeal rejected a nondelegation
challenge to an almost identical first contract arbitration provision

204.
205.
206.
207.

29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 173(a) (2006).
Id. § 141.
Id. § 174.
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of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA).2 °8
Under the California Constitution, a legislative delegation is
permissible unless the legislature has failed "to render basic policy
decisions., 20 9 Like EFCA, the ALRA provided for first contract
arbitration but did not specify the factors the arbitrator should use
to resolve the dispute.21' The state agency adopted a set of criteria
to govern the arbitration process. The California legislature later
amended the statute to add those criteria to the statute, but at the
time the events leading to the case occurred, the criteria were not
yet in the statute. The California court concluded that the
legislature had made the "basic policy decisions" when it
concluded that first contract arbitration was necessary to prevent
failures to bargain, to improve the working conditions of
agricultural employees, and to promote stability in agriculture.2 1'
The fact that the statute did not specify the criteria for the arbitrator
did not render the statute unconstitutional because the court
concluded that the agency was2 ermitted to use its expertise to
decide the details of the process.
Other provisions of federal law make similarly broad
delegations of authority to the FMCS and to arbitrators to resolve
disputes. For example, Section 206 of the LMRA provides for
third-party dispute resolution in the case of labor disputes that "in
the opinion of the President of the United States . . . will, if
permitted to occur or continue, imperil the national health or
safety., 213 This is a very broad and largely standardless delegation
208. Hess Collection Winery v. Cal. Agric. Labor Relations Board, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). The California Supreme Court denied review
in that case. Id.
209. Id. at 624.
210. The ALRA calls the process mediation, but unlike what is usually
described as mediation (in which the third party lacks the power to impose a
resolution on the parties), the ALRA procedure empowers the mediator to
impose a resolution on the bargaining dispute. It is thus indistinguishable from
first contract arbitration under EFCA.
211. Hess Collection Winery, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 624.
212. Id. at 624. The California Supreme Court has, however, found invalid a
state statute that provided for interest arbitration for county government
employees on the ground that the state legislature lacked the authority under the
state constitution to set salaries for county government employees. County of
Riverside v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713 (Cal. 2003). This was not a
nondelegation case, but rather a case on the respective powers of state and local
government. State supreme courts in other states generally have rejected
constitutional challenges to statutes providing interest arbitration for public
sector employees. See Joseph R. Grodin & Joyce M. Najita, JudicialResponse

to Arbitration, in PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING (Benjamin Aaron et al. eds., 2d.
ed. 1988).
213. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (2006).
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of power by Congress to the President to decide which labor
disputes will "imperil the national health or safety" and to make
appointments to the board of inquiry to resolve the dispute.21 4
Similarly, the Federal Arbitration Act provides for arbitration to
determine individual employment disputes
215 without specifying
procedures or standards for the arbitration.
Consider a simple example. A union is newly recognized or
certified. The employer proposes in negotiations to continue to pay
$7.50 per hour, the rate the employer had set unilaterally before the
union organizing campaign began. The union requests $9.50 per
hour. The wages that will ultimately be paid will be determined
either by a collective bargaining agreement, in which case the
wages will be set based on whether the employer or the union has
more leverage, or, if no agreement is reached, by unilateral action
of the employer. Under EFCA, if no agreement is reached and
mediation fails, an arbitrator would be appointed and empowered
to decide the dispute. Under the settled practices of interest
arbitration, the arbitrator could either choose one of the parties'
final offers (in which case, the wages would be either $7.50 or
$9.50) or adopt a wage that makes the most sense according to his
own judgment. Arbitrators often split the difference, and so the
wages might be $8.50. Under the version of EFCA introduced in
March 2009, the FMCS is empowered to direct arbitrators as to the
best method of arbitration to use, just as every other federal agency
that resolves disputes is authorized to decide which process of
dispute resolution is most conducive to the statutory goal. Under
revised versions of the bill reported in the news in the fall of 2009,
the FMCS would apparently
be required to direct arbitrators to use
216
the final offer method. In either circumstance, the delegation of
power to an arbitrator to resolve the dispute over wages for the
bargaining unit is perfectly constitutional.

214. The statute specifies only that the President "may appoint a board of
inquiry" of "a chairman and" an unspecified number of members with
unspecified qualifications, that the board of inquiry should make "a written
report... within such time as [the President] shall prescribe." The report "shall
include a statement of the facts" but "shall not contain any recommendations,"
and the board of inquiry "shall have power to sit and act in any place within the
United States and to conduct such hearings either in public or in private, as it
may deem necessary or proper, to ascertain the facts with respect to the causes
and circumstances of the dispute." 29 U.S.C. §§ 176, 177 (2006).
215. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
216. See supra note 6.
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C. Other ConstitutionalArguments
As weak as the nondelegation argument about first contract
arbitration is, the other constitutional challenges that have been
leveled at it are even more preposterous. In the California case
described above that upheld interest arbitration for agricultural
employees, the employers argued also that interest arbitration
violated the liberty of contract supposedly protected by substantive
due process, denied employers due process by eliminating judicial
review, and deprived agricultural employers of the equal protection
217
of the laws by subjecting only them to interest arbitration.
Richard Epstein has argued that EFCA's first contract arbitration
constitutes a taking of private property violative of the Fifth
Amendment by imposing an "expropriation risk of forcing
employer to pay far more for workers . . . than they would
voluntarily agree to do." 218 Under well-settled principles of
constitutional
law, these arguments do not even pass the red face
2 19
test.
First, as pointed out by the California Court of Appeal, the
substantive due process-liberty of contract argument has not
enjoyed support since 1937 when the Supreme Court abandoned its
lonely fight against the New Deal. 220 No wonder then that the
employers in the California agricultural interest arbitration case
cited only cases from the 1920s and early 1930s to support their
position. 2"11 Second, inasmuch as employers have successfully
defended their own right to resolve all disputes with their nonunion employees through arbitration without judicial review under
the Federal Arbitration Act, it is difficult to see how they could
argue that imposing2 arbitration on them over their objection
violates due process. 22 Third, although the California agricultural
employers argued that imposing interest arbitration on some
sectors of the economy but not on others violates equal protection,
the California court had little trouble discerning a rational basis for
217. Hess Collection Winery, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609.
218. Epstein, Ominous EFCA, supranote 31 at 54.
219. See, e.g., In re Premier Auto. Servs., Inc., 492 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir.
2007) (rejecting idea of "a right to do business" under substantive due process);
Lin v. Great Rose Fashion, Inc., No. 08-cv-4778 (NGG), 2009 WL 1544749, at
*14 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2009) (characterizing similar argument as one made
with "infinite audacity").
220. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
221. Hess Collection Winery, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 618-19.
222. See id. at 621-22; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991).
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the legislative decision regarding the scope of interest arbitrationand a rational basis is all that is required for economic
legislation.2 23 As for Epstein's argument that interest arbitration
imposes a taking on employers, since he freely concedes that
minimum wage regulation does not constitute a taking,2 24 it is hard
to see how arbitral resolution of wage disputes would do so. He
asserts that the distinction between EFCA and minimum wage
regulation is that EFCA "force[s] the employer to hire some
so," 225
arbitrary workers at that wage when it does not wish to do
but this statement is completely false. EFCA does not force an
employer to hire employees. It simply regulates wages and
working conditions and the process of establishing wages and
working conditions, just like every other piece of labor legislation
enacted since the New Deal. As noted above, interest arbitration is
no more of a taking from employers than the current system of
allowing the unilateral imposition of a contract on employees is a
taking from them.
What these antiquated constitutional arguments do reveal is
that current opposition to interest arbitration is really a variation of
the arguments employers made early in the twentieth century
against unions, collective bargaining, wage and hour regulation,
laws protecting workplace safety, and every other form of
legislation aimed at protecting workers. All such laws restrict the
ability of companies to use their concerted power and market
dominance to impose conditions on workers that are unhealthy or
unfair. Employers resisted such laws on the grounds that they
interfere with the employers' supposed constitutional right to
dictate working terms, and courts since 1937 have unanimously
rejected the employers' arguments. Any challenge to the interest
arbitration provision on freedom of contract grounds would call
into question all of these laws, as well as longstanding Supreme
Court precedent like West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,226 an
unlikely proposition even if free market advocates may support
such a course of action. Of course, as with all the modem
regulation of working conditions and labor markets, reasonable
people may disagree about whether every provision of EFCA
represents wise policy. For the reasons given above, we believe it
is wise policy. But it is a policy argument to be won or lost in the
legislature, not a constitutional argument to be resolved in the
courts.
223. Hess Collection Winery, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 623.
224. Epstein, Ominous EFCA, supra note 31 at 54.

225. Id.
226. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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V. CONCLUSION

The interest arbitration provision of EFCA will fill a glaring
hole in current labor law by ending the process by which
employers can flout the duty to bargain, talk a union to death, and
thus act with total impunity in defeating the employees' choice of
unionization. The provision creates no new substantive right but
merely provides employees (and employers) with a means to
enforce their existing right to engage in good faith bargaining over
the terms of their employment. As such, interest arbitration will
have no effect on law-abiding employers who negotiate in good
faith to reach an agreement with their employees. It will only affect
those employers who violate the law, and it will do so by adopting
a time-honored and tested arbitration process.
First contract arbitration is not necessarily pro-labor. In today's
economic and legal climate, however, it is pro-labor because a
surplus of labor, the lack of grassroots labor militance, and the
widespread tendency of firms to permanently replace striking
workers all combine to make strikes rare and unions weak. But
someday the tables may turn, and labor may feel that it can get a
better deal by striking. If there is a return of the labor militance of
the 1930s, which closed down entire cities like San Francisco and
Detroit in general strikes and secured good wages because workers
were willing to occupy entire steel mills and auto factories, we
may expect to see business groups insisting that first contract
arbitration is necessary to protect the free flow of commerce and
labor groups complaining that it deprives labor and management of
the freedom to set their own terms. There is historical precedent; as
this Article has shown, first contract arbitration, which is now
excoriated by the Chamber of Commerce as a terrible infringement
on the right of businesses to contract freely with their employees,
has in the past been regarded by business as an invaluable
protection against rapacious and irresponsible unions and by
unions as a terrible infringement of the fundamental freedom to use
their market power to secure better wages.
But it is also important to remember that the first contract
arbitration proposed by EFCA is a relatively modest two-year limit
on the ability of management and labor to use their economic
leverage. After the first contract, it will still be up to management
and labor to negotiate a contract. If the union has not done enough
to secure the support of workers, and if labor market conditions
favor management, we may expect to see employers bargain hard,
insist on reductions in the economic and noneconomic terms in the
first contract, unilaterally implement such reductions after impasse,
lock out the employees and temporarily replace them or
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permanently replace them if there is a strike, hire anti-union
replacement workers, and ultimately get rid of the union through a
decertification election or withdrawal of recognition.
Commentators are entitled to their beliefs that the interest
arbitration provision is a bad policy choice. However, many antiEFCA arguments simply reflect opposition to any legislation that
aims to equalize the disparities in bargaining power between
employees and employers. But if interest arbitration merely means
that laborers will gain power and employers will no longer be able
to flout the good faith bargaining requirement of the NLRA that
has been in existence for seventy years, that does not mean interest
arbitration is an inappropriate procedure for first contracts. Rather,
it means interest arbitration may just be the perfect solution.

